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NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
A Mind of Her Own
He´le`ne Metzger to E´ mile Meyerson, 1933
By Cristina Chimisso* and Gad Freudenthal**
ABSTRACT
In May 1933 the historian of chemistry He´le`ne Metzger addressed a letter to the renowned
historian and philosopher of science E´ mile Meyerson, a cri de coeur against Meyerson’s
patronizing attitude toward her. This recently discovered letter is published and translated
here because it is an exceptional human document reflecting the gender power structure
of our discipline in interwar France. At the age of forty-three, and with five books to her
credit, Metzger was still a junior scholar in the exclusively male community of French
historians and philosophers of science. We sketch the institutional setting of higher learning
in France at the time, noting the limited openings it offered to would-be femmes savantes,
and situate Metzger in this context. We also describe the philosophical differences between
Metzger and Meyerson. Though Metzger never managed to obtain a post of her own, in
her letter to Meyerson she forcefully lays claim, at least, to a mind of her own.
H E´ LE` NE METZGER, ne´e Bruhl, was one of the first female historians of science tohave left a lasting mark on the discipline. We here publish a recently discovered letter
that she addressed to the well-known philosopher E´ mile Meyerson in May 1933, a poignant
cri de coeur against Meyerson’s patronizing and domineering attitude toward her. Metzger
writes that she refuses to be “educated,” “modified,” or “deformed,” adding that she con-
siders as a “‘potential’ enemy whatever individual (a parent, a teacher, a physician, etc.)
who is invested with a little bit of authority and who wants to use his prestige in order to
* Department of Philosophy, Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, United Kingdom.
** CNRS, Centre d’Histoire des Sciences et des Philosophies Arabes et Me´die´vales, 7 Rue Guy Moˆquet, B.P.
No. 8, 94801 Villejuif Ce´dex, France.
One of us (G.F.) learned that Meyerson’s Nachlass is kept at the Central Zionist Archives (CZA) in Jerusalem
during a conversation with Dominique Bourel of the Centre de Recherches Franc¸ais de Je´rusalem (CRFJ) of the
CNRS; subsequently, Eva Telkes, also of the CRFJ, confirmed that letters from Metzger to Meyerson were
among those papers. Simone Schliachter of the CZA kindly replied to various queries related to these papers,
and Esti Micenmacher obtained photocopies of the letters for us. We are sincerely indebted to all of them.
478 A MIND OF HER OWN
Figure 1. He´le`ne Metzger, circa 1940s (photograph courtesy of Gad Freudenthal).
impose upon me his ideas or way of seeing things.” She further writes: “Do not anymore
take me for a child, for a student,” insisting: “When I read you, I do not feel humble, or
like a little girl in the presence of your greatness.” For: “In the Republic of the minds, we
are all equal.”1 This is plainly a revolt—indeed, a long-contained revolt. The letter is
offered to the readers of Isis not as a contribution to the history of our discipline in prewar
France but as a unique document testifying to the arduous battle women scholars had to
win before they could hope to have their work considered and appreciated on its merits.
It is a tribute not to He´le`ne Metzger’s scholarly achievement but to her impressive courage
as a human being and as a woman. (See Figure 1.)
He´le`ne Metzger was born on 26 August 1889 in Chatou, near Paris, to an upper middle-
class Jewish family.2 Her father did not allow his two daughters to pursue their studies up
1 He´le`ne Metzger’s letter to E´ mile Meyerson, dated 6 May 1933, is found among a collection of some twenty-
five letters and postcards Metzger addressed to Meyerson between 1923 and 1933. These are preserved among
Meyerson’s personal papers at the Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, file number A 408/71. The fact that
Meyerson’s papers are at the CZA may surprise historians of science; it is a consequence of Meyerson’s having
held a central position in the Jewish Colonization Association. The Jewish Colonization Association was founded
in 1891 as a philanthropic organization that assisted Jews who were persecuted or in depressed economic cir-
cumstances to emigrate and settle somewhere (notably in Argentina) where they could find productive employ-
ment. See Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem, 1972), Vol. 10, pp. 44–49.
2 Our main source of information on Metzger’s life, offering both factual details and insights into how she
viewed her situation within the French community of historians of science, is the collection of letters she wrote
to George Sarton between 1921 and 1944, preserved among Sarton’s papers at the Houghton Library, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, call number bMS Am 1803 (1032). These letters have been published
almost in their entirety as He´le`ne Metzger, “Extraits de lettres, 1921–1944,” in E´ tudes sur/Studies on He´le`ne
Metzger, ed. Gad Freudenthal (Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp. 247–269 (hereafter cited as Metzger, “Lettres”). For a
biography see Freudenthal, “He´le`ne Metzger: E´ le´ments de biographie,” ibid., pp. 197–208 (the volume also
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to the baccalaure´at but had them stop at the bre´vet supe´rieur, which permitted university
study for three years only. In 1912 Metzger obtained a diploˆme d’e´tudes supe´rieures in
crystallography, a diploma that ruled out her pursuing studies for a doctorat d’E´ tat, the
qualification necessary to apply for an appointment as a university professor. In 1914, after
only a few months of marriage, Metzger was widowed, and she henceforth devoted herself
entirely to research in the history of science. In 1918 she submitted a thesis on the “Emer-
gence of the Science of Crystals” and was awarded the unprestigious degree of doctorat
d’universite´. During the 1920s and 1930s Metzger, who supported herself on the money
from her dowry, pursued her research and published six monographs, notably on the history
of chemistry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and a considerable number of
papers on problems of method in the historiography of science.3 After the occupation of
France by Nazi Germany in 1940 she at first stayed in Paris, but in late 1941 she went to
Lyon (in the so-called free zone). She refused to go into hiding and was arrested there by
the Gestapo on 8 February 1944, just a few months before the liberation of France. She
was deported from Drancy (near Paris) to Auschwitz on 7 March 1944 and either perished
on the way there or was put to death on her arrival.
E´ mile Meyerson, to whom Metzger’s letter is addressed, was her senior by thirty years,
an established and well-respected philosopher. Born in Lublin, Poland, in 1859, Meyerson
studied chemistry in Germany before moving to Paris at the age of twenty-three. There he
worked in the laboratory of the famous chemist Paul Schutzenberger (1829–1897) and
then as a chemist in a factory. From 1897 to the end of his life he held a central position
in the Jewish Colonization Association, devoting himself in parallel to his philosophical
work. Meyerson’s voluminous books, based on a remarkable knowledge of sources in
many languages and on a mastery of scientific theories, including recent ones, won him
the respect and admiration of philosophers and scientists in France and abroad. Although
he never married, Meyerson regularly hosted salons attended by the most distinguished
philosophers and historians of science of the time, and he was personally acquainted with
such scientists as Albert Einstein and Louis de Broglie. His cosmopolitan life, as well as
his broad education and outlook, made him more similar to Alexandre Koyre´ than to
Metzger. Meyerson became well known in the English-speaking world subsequent to the
publication and wide diffusion of Identity and Reality in 1930.4
contains a bibliography of Metzger’s work and articles on various aspects of her life and work). A shorter version
in English is forthcoming in Paula Hyman and Dalia Ofer, eds., Jewish Women: A Comprehensive Historical
Encyclopedia, CD-ROM (Jerusalem: Shalvi, in press). For a study of Metzger’s philosophical project in its social
and intellectual settings see Cristina Chimisso, “He´le`ne Metzger: The History of Science between the Study of
Mentalities and Total History,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2001, 32:203–241.
3 For the published version of the thesis see He´le`ne Metzger, La gene`se de la science des cristaux (Paris:
Alcan, 1918; rpt., Paris: Blanchard, 1969). The monographs are Metzger, Les doctrines chimiques en France du
de´but du XVIIe a` la fin du XVIIIe sie`cle (Paris: Presses Univ. France, 1923; rpt., Paris: Blanchard, 1969); Metzger,
Les concepts scientifiques (Paris: Alcan, 1926); Metzger, Newton, Stahl, Boerhaave et la doctrine chimique
(Paris: Alcan, 1930; rpt., Paris: Blanchard, 1974); Metzger, La chimie (Paris: Boccard, 1930); Metzger, La
philosophie de la matie`re chez Lavoisier (Paris: Hermann, 1935); and Metzger, Attraction universelle et religion
naturelle chez quelques commentateurs anglais de Newton (Paris: Hermann, 1938). The essays are collected in
Metzger, La me´thode philosophique en histoire des sciences, ed. Gad Freudenthal (Paris: Fayard, 1987).
4 On Meyerson’s life see Andre´ Metz, “E´ mile Meyerson” [Se´ance du 26 novembre 1960: “Comme´moration
du centenaire de la naissance de deux E´ piste´mologues franc¸ais: E´ mile Meyerson et Gaston Milhaud”], Bulletin
de la Socie´te´ Franc¸aise de Philosophie, 1961, pp. 98–105; Encyclopedia Judaica (cit. n. 1), Vol. 11, pp. 1468–
1469; and Yoram Mayorek, “E´ mile Meyerson and the Beginning of the Involvement of the Jewish Colonization
Association in Eretz Israel” [in Hebrew], Cathedra for the History of Eretz Israel and Its Yishuv (Jerusalem),
1991, 62:67–79. For his publications see, notably, E´ mile Meyerson, Identite´ et re´alite´, 3rd ed. (Paris: Payot,
1908) (the English translation is Identity and Reality, trans. K. Loewenberg [London: Allen & Unwin, 1930]);
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Although Metzger is one of the few prewar French historians of science whose work is
still widely read today, she suffered throughout her life from a lack of recognition of her
value as a scholar and never held any academic position.5 She thus struggled continually
on two distinct but related fronts—intellectual and institutional. These provide the twofold
setting in which her letter to Meyerson must be read.
THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT
Metzger and Meyerson differed profoundly in their assessments of the nature of scientific
knowledge and in the goals of their work. Indeed, Metzger refers in her letter to “our old
lively philosophical discussions.” A first, rough, approximation of the nature of their dif-
ferences can be given by saying that Meyerson was primarily a philosopher whereas Metz-
ger was a historian. It is difficult indeed to understand French history and philosophy of
science, especially in the interwar period, without considering the simultaneous strong
links and conflicting outlooks of the historical and philosophical approaches to the study
of science.6
Metzger began her work in the history of science in complete isolation from any intel-
lectual or institutional context. When she showed the manuscript of La gene`se de la science
des cristaux to her crystallography professor, he dismissed her work and historical interests
altogether. But she soon found her way to a group of Sorbonne philosophers who shared
her philosophical interest in the study of the history of science: Gaston Milhaud, Le´on
Brunschvicg, Andre´ Lalande, and Abel Rey. Especially important was her uncle Lucien
Le´vy-Bruhl, whom she did not mind calling her “professor” and whom she always men-
tioned with admiration and affection.7
Many French philosophers at the time believed that the study of intellectual history
would provide a repository of case studies for investigations of the way the human mind
works. E´ mile Bre´hier regarded history of philosophy as “the substitute for the experimental
method in philosophy,” for “it shows thousands of variations of the human reason, in
relation with the period, the social milieus, the religions, the states of the sciences [and]
of civilizations.” Some thought that the history of science provided the best “laboratory”
for epistemology. Lalande began a review essay of Meyerson’s De l’explication dans les
sciences of 1921 by saying that “nowadays” everybody agreed that introspection was
insufficient for a study of the mental functions. It was necessary to study “intelligence’s
Meyerson, De l’explication dans les sciences, 2 vols. (Paris: Payot, 1921); and Meyerson, Du cheminement de
la pense´e, 3 vols. (Paris: Alcan, 1931). The published correspondence between Meyerson and Harald Høffding
shows the wide network of Meyerson’s intellectual and personal friendships and acquaintances: Correspondence
entre Harald Høffding et E´ mile Meyerson, ed. Frithiof Brandt, Hans Høffding, and Jean Adigard des Gautries
(1939; rpt., Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 2002).
5 Meyerson, too, never had an academic post, although to our knowledge this had no detrimental effect on his
self-esteem.
6 There is a persistent misperception that Metzger and Meyerson had kindred philosophical approaches to the
study of science. This perception has been nurtured, notably, by the fact that the late Thomas S. Kuhn mentioned
Alexandre Koyre´, E´ mile Meyerson, He´le`ne Metzger, and Anneliese Maier together as authors that had most
influenced him; see T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1962),
p. vii n 1. The relationship between history and philosophy in the study of science in France in the interwar
period is analyzed in Cristina Chimisso, Gaston Bachelard: Critic of Science and the Imagination (Routledge
Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy) (London/New York: Routledge, 2001), Ch. 5.
7 He´le`ne Metzger to George Sarton, 20 June 1922, in Metzger, “Lettres,” pp. 249–250 (crystallography pro-
fessor); and Metzger to Sarton, 18 May 1922, quoted in Freudenthal, “He´le`ne Metzger: E´ le´ments de biographie”
(cit. n. 2), p. 198 (Le´vy-Bruhl). In another letter she said that Le´vy-Bruhl always supported her research and
was always “the first reader” of her work: Metzger to Sarton, 14 April 1927, in Metzger, “Lettres,” p. 255.
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objective products” through an examination of “facts and sources” in the history of science
from its “primitive forms” to the present. Meyerson himself made a very similar point in
Identite´ et re´alite´ and at the beginning of Du cheminement de la pense´e. In the 1960s and
1970s Georges Canguilhem still used the metaphor of the laboratory to explain the role
that history played in epistemology.8
Meyerson’s aim was to provide an account of the mechanism and the value of knowledge
that would apply in all times and places. Very generally, he wanted to demonstrate that
knowledge is always a process of identification and construction of causal links. Reason
identifies what is to be known and what is already known and establishes unity beyond
apparent diversity. Causality, for Meyerson, is the principle of identity in time. In his view,
to understand reality is to understand identities, which are not a construct of the mind but,
rather, belong to reality. Meyerson thus thought that the apparent variety of ways of think-
ing exhibited by the history of science in truth hides an underlying identity of the funda-
mental mental mechanisms: it was the task of epistemology to unveil this underlying
identity. Thus his epistemology follows the same method he attributed to science: it es-
tablishes the identity of apparently different types of logic.
Metzger subscribed to the philosophical view of the history of science, whose goals she
defined as being to improve our knowledge of the human mind and, in consequence, to
use our intelligence more wisely and less empirically than we have done so far in for-
mulating scientific, philosophical, and historical theories at random. Yet unlike many
epistemologists, and Meyerson in particular, Metzger focused her research on well-
circumscribed periods and fastidiously examined alchemists’ and chemists’ texts. Her im-
mediate questions concerned how, say, Le´mery, E´ tienne de Clave, Stahl, or Boerhaave
thought, how they organized knowledge, and, most important, what their implicit assump-
tions and worldviews were. In examining doctrines that modern chemistry, and indeed
modern “common sense,” deemed absurd, her main question was: How did these theories
seem perfectly reasonable to seventeenth-century scholars and the lay public? Far from
aiming to establish conclusively how human reason works in all times and places, Metzger
regarded that ambition as philosophy’s “strange mania,” consisting in the wish “to pose
definitive concepts either a priori or a posteriori.”9 She believed that this “mania” stemmed
from a psychological need for certainty, and she thought that history could provide the
cure for it. Here lies the core of the different attitudes to philosophical and historical
research held by Metzger and Meyerson.
Thus, where Meyerson saw identities, Metzger confronted the utter “otherness” of the
ways of thinking of her alchemists and aimed at grasping their way of proceeding “from
within,” without seeking to reduce the originality of their thought to mere “mistakes” or
confused anticipations of what was to come. Her approach to the history of science pre-
vented her from minimizing differences and led her to reach conclusions opposite to those
of Meyerson on the philosophical issue of the day, that of different “mentalities.”
8 [E´ mile Bre´hier], “Notre programme,” Revue d’Histoire de la Philosophie, 1927, 1:1–4, on p. 4; Andre´
Lalande, “L’e´piste´mologie de M. Meyerson et sa porte´e philosophique,” Revue Philosophique de la France et
de l’E´ tranger, 1922, 47:259–280, on p. 259; Meyerson, Identite´ et re´alite´ (cit. n. 4), pp. xiii–xiv; Meyerson,
Identity and Reality, trans. Loewenberg (cit. n. 4), pp. 7–8; Meyerson, Cheminement de la pense´e (cit. n. 4),
p. viii; Georges Canguilhem, E´ tudes d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences (Paris: Vrin, 1968), p. 12; and
Canguilhem, Ide´ologie et rationalite´ dans l’histoire des sciences de la vie (Paris: Vrin, 1977), pp. 12–13.
9 He´le`ne Metzger, “La me´thode philosophique dans l’histoire des sciences,” in Me´thode philosophique, ed.
Freudenthal (cit. n. 3), pp. 57–74, on p. 59 (goals of history of science); and Metzger, “Tribunal de l’histoire et
the´orie de la connaissance scientifique,” ibid., pp. 23–39, on p. 38.
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Lucien Le´vy-Bruhl was responsible for sparking the discussion about what he called
mentalities—and particularly about “primitive mentality,” the focus of his La mentalite´
primitive.10 Le´vy-Bruhl, professor of history of philosophy at the Sorbonne, shared the
interest of many of his colleagues in determining the mechanisms of thought. Like them,
moreover, he thought that an empirical study of the different products of intellectual history
was needed. But whereas most of his colleagues found their epistemological “laboratory”
in the study of the past, Le´vy-Bruhl turned to Melanesian and African cultures. Instead of
investigating another time, he elected to investigate other places. He reached the conclusion
that the Melanesians’ and Africans’ way of thinking differed in important respects from
that of Westerners—that their frame of mind was a different “mentality.” The thesis that
perhaps provoked the most heated discussions was that the thinking of so-called primitive
peoples did not follow the law of noncontradiction.
Le´vy-Bruhl’s theories had a tremendous impact on many disciplines from the 1920s
onward. The study of past texts or other civilizations acquired great epistemological rele-
vance given its direct bearing on the question of whether people in different times and
cultures thought differently. The position that scholars took vis-a`-vis Le´vy-Bruhl’s views
had immediate implications for the way in which they regarded their own disciplines.11
Le´vy-Bruhl’s stance was clearly the opposite of that of Meyerson, who did not fail to
react. Chapter 2 of Du cheminement de la pense´e, entitled “Le physicien et l’homme
primitif,” seeks to demonstrate that there is no difference between the physicist’s logic and
what Le´vy-Bruhl called “laws of participation,” which allegedly governed “primitive”
thought. Meyerson thought that he had found the pattern underlying all human “intellect,”
not only that of “the civilized man, which one can suppose to be influenced by science
and philosophy.”12 With respect to the history of science, his chief aim was to demonstrate
that there was no significant difference between common sense and science, or indeed
between science and past investigations into nature.
Metzger rejected this view. Central to her interests were the differences in ways of
thinking, which seemed so dramatic to her, between alchemists and modern chemists. But
she did not simply adopt Le´vy-Bruhl’s theory: her view was a sort of “third way” between
those who saw radical differences in ways of thinking and those who denied them alto-
gether. Metzger held that all human beings, in every time and place, shared what she called
“expansive thought”: by this she meant thought in its spontaneous and creative phase, not
yet disciplined by formal logic. A crucial characteristic of this way of thinking was seeking
analogies between objects, which she held to be instinctive. While she analyzed different
types of analogy, the one that interested her most was what she termed “active analogy”
(analogie agissante), the action of similar on similar. She found a wealth of examples of
active analogy in her sources, and she identified this analogy “in its pure state” with Le´vy-
10 Lucien Le´vy-Bruhl, La mentalite´ primitive (Paris: Alcan, 1922).
11 Metzger pointed out that “[Le´vy-Bruhl’s doctrine] has immediately gone beyond the small circle of the
specialists which it seemed to address: it has been read, discussed, commented on, employed, not only by
ethnologists, travelers and colonial administrators; but also by philosophers, psychiatrists, psychologists, peda-
gogues, sociologists and historians”: He´le`ne Metzger, “La philosophie de Lucien Le´vy-Bruhl et l’histoire des
sciences,” in Me´thode philosophique, ed. Freudenthal (cit. n. 3), pp. 113–124, on p. 117. The controversy about
“primitive mentality” that took place in Paris in the 1920s cannot be separated from the institutional restructuring
that took place in the same period and that saw sociology, psychology, history of science, and ethnology acquire
or strengthen their independence from philosophy. See Cristina Chimisso, “The Mind and the Faculties: The
Controversy over ‘Primitive Mentality’ and the Struggle for Disciplinary Space at the Inter-War Sorbonne,”
History of the Human Sciences, 2000, 13:47–68.
12 Meyerson, Cheminement de la pense´e (cit. n. 4), p. 31.
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Bruhl’s “law of participation,” which he held to govern the thought of non-Western people.
She found this mode of thinking in magical practices, in Renaissance medicine, and in
primary sources such as Stahl’s writings—for instance, when he argued that two substances
can combine if some of their parts are similar.13
Unlike Le´vy-Bruhl, Metzger held that “expansive thought” was not lost to modern
people, not even to scientists. Indeed, she believed that it was at the basis of the “most
beautiful discoveries [and] the most admirable inventions.” In order for these intuitive
discoveries to become scientific, however, “clear, limpid, and logical thought” had to
discipline and order “spontaneous thought.”14 In other words, those first intuitions needed
to be elaborated and tested according to the logic of modern science. Yet although all
spontaneous thought is at bottom one, still different historical periods exhibit different
ways of thinking. In Metzger’s terminology: for every historical period, the historian can
isolate different “a prioris”—that is, conceptual structures—governing the thought of that
period. Metzger’s “a priori” is very close to Le´vy-Bruhl’s “mentality.”
The implications of this debate for the history of science are clear. In Metzger’s view,
the “philosophers of metal” believed that they could turn lead into gold because they based
their reasoning on the analogy according to which lead was to gold what a child is to an
adult; the former is an imperfect version of the latter, which already contains the perfect
version as a potentiality. Accordingly, the alchemists do not look to be irrational or simple
dreamers. On the other hand, in Meyerson’s view, which allows for no differences between
the alchemists and modern scientists and presupposes that they all proceed by a process
of identification of different elements, the only possible conclusion is that the “philosophers
of metal” made gross mistakes about the elements that they chose to identify with one
another.
Metzger and Meyerson were thus fundamentally divided: they agreed that the most basic
theoretical concept at the focus of their work was the “human mind,” but they held opposite
views of its nature and, consequently, of the object and methods of their study of the
history of science.
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
A superficial reading of Metzger’s letter to Meyerson suffices to make clear that her ve-
hemence could not have been due to philosophical differences alone. The letter is personal,
the tone is emotional, and no allusion whatsoever is made to the contents of philosophical
discussions. To understand it we must take a closer look at the relationship between Metz-
ger and Meyerson, set in the context of Metzger’s institutional position in Paris academic
life in the interwar period.
The feelings of resentment and opposition so clearly and forcefully aired in the letter
had been building up for a long time. We do not know exactly when Metzger and Meyerson
first met, but in all probability it was in early 1923.15 Only four years later, Metzger already
13 Metzger, Doctrines chimiques en France (cit. n. 3), p. 348; Metzger, Attraction universelle et religion
naturelle (cit. n. 3), p. 8; and Metzger, Concepts scientifiques (cit. n. 3), p. 43.
14 Metzger, “Philosophie de Lucien Le´vy-Bruhl” (cit. n. 11), p. 121. We of course refer to Le´vy-Bruhl’s views
before the revision of his theory expressed in the posthumously published Carnets (1947); this revision is
irrelevant for a comparison with the work of Metzger, who died in 1944.
15 In 1929 Metzger wrote: “I did not become acquainted with him [Meyerson] personally and I did not study
his books until after I had done much work and published two volumes.” He´le`ne Metzger, “La philosophie
d’E´ mile Meyerson et l’histoire des sciences,” in Me´thode philosophique, ed. Freudenthal (cit. n. 3), pp. 95–106,
on p. 95. Metzger’s second monograph, Les doctrines chimiques en France, was published in 1923. The first
484 A MIND OF HER OWN
sensed that she was considered Meyerson’s disciple; and in a letter to George Sarton she
protested vigorously:
I once or twice saw again M. Meyerson, who chose to ignore my little book and to be very
friendly; he absolutely wants me to compile an index for his next book, which is on nearly the
same topic; I am looking for a way to refuse politely and without offending him. I greatly
admire his endeavor; if he wishes so, I will declare myself his pupil or his disciple (although
everything that I have published has been written outside his influence), but I refuse to be the
slave of [even] the greatest philosopher in the world, for nature has endowed me with a brain.16
In 1929 Metzger said much the same thing in her public address to the Comite´ Inter-
national d’Histoire des Sciences, which met in the framework of the first International
Congress for the History of Science, held in Paris. Metzger chose Meyerson’s philosophy
as the topic of her talk, which opened with these telling words:
It is a pleasure for me to begin my report today by paying a personal tribute to M. Meyerson,
who took a lively interest in my work in the history of chemistry, putting at my disposal a
friendly and continuing devotion, as well as his great erudition and his philosophical meditation.
I cannot say that he was my teacher—and I am sorry for this—for I did not become acquainted
with him personally and I did not study his books until after I had done much work and
published two volumes. Nor can I describe myself entirely as his disciple, for the problems that
interest me most are not quite those that his epistemological work has tried to clarify. But I
wish to thank him publicly for his valuable advice and encouragement, and to assure him of
my gratitude.17
Both the private letter and the public speech carry a clear message of denial: no, Metzger
says, Meyerson was not my teacher; although I occasionally discuss my work with him, I
am not intellectually indebted to him. To drive home the point that she is not Meyerson’s
“disciple,” Metzger goes so far as to detail the chronology of her work and the beginning
of her acquaintance with Meyerson. In the Paris academic milieu, in which patronage was
very important, intellectual lineage was often emphasized and played important real and
symbolic roles. Certainly many scholars would have been happy to declare themselves
Meyerson’s “disciples,” and Alexandre Koyre´, for one, did not hesitate to call Meyerson
his “teacher.” Metzger clearly intended to set the record straight and disavow the lineage
that in some people’s minds linked her to Meyerson. Indeed, her 1930 dedication of New-
ton, Stahl, Boerhaave et la doctrine chimique to Meyerson may in part have been a move
intended to reinforce her position in the Paris academic setting by claiming his patronage,
while yet refusing to be considered his “disciple.”18
item in the collection of letters that Metzger addressed to Meyerson is a postcard dated 6 Mar. 1923. Interestingly,
almost as soon as Metzger became acquainted with Sarton she alerted him to the publication of Meyerson’s De
l’explication dans les sciences and offered to write a review, thereby putting herself in the position of the master’s
messenger even before she came to know him personally: Metzger to Sarton, 21 July 1921, in Metzger, “Lettres,”
p. 248. This review was published in Isis, 1922, 4:382–385; for her subsequent reviews of Meyerson’s books
see ibid., 1925, 5:517–520; 1927, 9:470–472; 1932, 17:444–445.
16 Metzger to Sarton, 14 Apr. 1927, in Metzger, “Lettres,” p. 255. She is referring to Les concepts scientifiques,
published in 1926. Meyerson was to cite that “little book” in footnotes to Du cheminement de la pense´e (pp. 806,
811); presumably he read it only after meeting with Metzger about the index. Metzger did not mind compiling
the indexes for Lucien Le´vy-Bruhl’s L’aˆme primitive (Paris: Presses Univ. France, 1927) and Le surnaturel et
la nature dans la mentalite´ primitive (Paris: Presses Univ. France, 1931); see p. xiii of the latter.
17 Metzger, “Philosophie d’E´ mile Meyerson” (cit. n. 15), p. 95.
18 For Koyre´’s reference to Meyerson as his “teacher” see Fondation “Pour la science,” Centre International
de Synthe`se, Section d’Histoire des Sciences, “Communications officielles: Se´ance du 23 Janvier 1935,” Ar-
cheion, 1935, 17:81–84, on p. 83. Metzger’s dedication was certainly also motivated by the fact that Meyerson
was involved in the writing of the chapter on Stahl; see Metzger to Sarton, 10 Aug. 1925, 29 Mar. 1926, in
Metzger, “Lettres,” p. 253.
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In the letter we publish here, Metzger finally expresses directly to Meyerson himself
her feelings of impatience—indeed, exasperation—with his imposed patronage and pa-
tronizing attitude. This letter should not be read simply as the result of a personal or
philosophical conflict between the two scholars. Rather, it is such a remarkable document
because it expresses Metzger’s suffering over the lack of recognition that she had to en-
dure—despite the value of her work and her continued service in running institutions
devoted to the history of science—as the consequence of women’s inferior status in French
academia.
Metzger was sharply aware of the difficult position of women in the community of
scholars in Paris in the interwar period. Her letters to Sarton reveal how much she longed
for a proper academic position and how frustrated she was by her repeated inability to
obtain one. Her failure was not due to the inferior quality of her publications or to their
not receiving recognition. The “little book” to which she referred in her 1927 letter to
Sarton, Les concepts scientifiques, won the Bordin Prize of the Acade´mie des Sciences
Morales et Politiques, on Lalande’s recommendation. But she continued to remain on the
institutional margins, never moving within. She taught at the Institut d’Histoire des Sci-
ences et Techniques, had responsibility for the coordination and direction of studies there,
and was the administrator and treasurer of the Comite´ International d’Histoire des Sciences.
Yet although she apparently had been promised, and very much hoped for, an appointment
as secretary of the Institut d’Histoire des Sciences (which was, even so, not an academic
position), the young Pierre Ducasse´ received preference.19 For a semester in the academic
year 1937/1938 she replaced Koyre´ at the E´ cole Pratique des Hautes E´ tudes—the same
Koyre´ whom she had introduced to the Centre de Synthe`se’s Unit for History of Science,
of which she was the secretary—but no permanent appointment followed.
A woman in French academia was, indeed, a rarity at that time. In the 1920s there were
only two women professors at the University of Paris, both in the Faculty of Sciences—
and one of them was Marie Curie. In the whole of France there were only four other
women lecturing at the university level, all in junior posts. Metzger did not express views
on this general sociological reality in her writings—even in her letters to Sarton—but she
was aware that her sex had limited her opportunities indirectly. She commented that her
education had not been of the academically prestigious kind. The fact that—bound by her
father’s decision—she did not attend a lyce´e leading to a baccalaure´at and thus attained
only a diploˆme d’e´tudes supe´rieures determined the type of degree course to which she
could be admitted and the doctorate she could earn: the doctorat d’universite´ she eventually
gained was a second-class degree, inferior to the doctorat d’E´ tat, and did not qualify her
for a career in French academia. Not coincidentally, that degree was pursued mainly by
foreigners and by women; only in 1914 were the first two doctorats d’E´ tat awarded to
women.20 Note, however, that Koyre´—who moved to France from Russia and Germany—
did not have the prestigious state doctorate either; but this was no obstacle to his appoint-
ment at the E´ cole Pratique des Hautes E´ tudes, where positions were awarded on scholarly
merit rather than based on formal qualifications.
Metzger was very aware of the social meaning of the “right” education. In a letter to
Sarton, she strongly criticized a new educational reform whereby qualifications in ancient
languages were essential for university admissions. She immediately realized that this
19 Metzger to Sarton, 1 Nov. 1937, in Metzger, “Lettres,” p. 260, expresses her disappointment over Ducasse´’s
preferment.
20 Edme´e Charrier, L’e´volution intellectuelle fe´minine (Paris: Mechelinck, 1931), pp. 407–408, 212.
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reform was to create gender and class barriers: as she explained, access to higher education
would be blocked to those who (like herself ) did not attend a lyce´e and thus de facto to
most women—even those who did attend a lyce´e, for girls’ lyce´es as a rule did not teach
Latin and Greek. She concluded that the elite would be chosen from those whose parents
could afford to provide a lyce´e education for their sons.21
Metzger perceived her lesser academic qualifications as due to her father’s prejudices.
She opined that he had prevented his “socialist (or almost)” daughters from having inde-
pendent professions, but had given them dowries so that they could marry young men “of
intellectual and moral value” whose only resource was their own modest earnings.22 He´le`ne
herself married a historian—Paul Metzger, professor of history at the University of Lyon.
By contrast, her father allowed his son to pursue the best education available: Adrien Bruhl
attended the E´ cole Normale Supe´rieure and eventually became the dean of the Faculty of
Arts of the Universite´ de Lyon.
Metzger’s reading of her father’s plans for his daughters is consistent with the findings
of later sociological studies. Christopher Charle has pointed out that class boundaries were
weaker among Jews than among Catholics and that it was relatively common for Jewish
intellectuals to marry wealthy Jewish women. His archetypal case study is Durkheim’s
marriage to the wealthy Julie Dreyfus, but many other examples can be noted.23 Henri
Bergson, the son of a musician of Polish origin, married the daughter of an executive of
the Rothschild bank; Le´on Brunschvicg, of humble background, married into a wealthy
merchant’s family. Lucien Le´vy also married into a prosperous merchant family, the
Bruhls, becoming Lucien Le´vy-Bruhl.
Thanks to her dowry, as the offspring of a family dedicated to commerce rather than
scholarship, Metzger had her own means of subsistence. In this she was similar to many
other Jewish scholars in that period, such as Durkheim, Brunschvicg, Bergson, Le´vy-Bruhl,
and Marcel Mauss. But in her case the prejudice against parvenus in the intellectual classes
was greatly reinforced by her gender. Her late husband’s academic colleagues looked down
on her as a wealthy amateur rather than a proper scholar. Metzger strongly resented their
denigrating attitude, especially because the lack of an academic position was so painful to
her and was certainly not due to any shortcomings of her work.24 Indeed, the lack of an
academic post was more readily forgiven in male scholars: E´ mile Meyerson himself en-
joyed high prestige even though he had no formal position in French academia.
The conflict between Metzger and Meyerson, far from being merely a clash of person-
alities or of different philosophical outlooks, stemmed essentially from structural problems
of society and from what we would today call “institutional sexism.” Throughout her life,
and much against her will, Metzger remained an outsider, “a perpetual junior member in
the groups she frequented.”25 The relationship with Meyerson was one element in this
larger social picture.
Perusal of the small collection of messages that Metzger sent Meyerson during the years
of their acquaintance confirms that their relationship was never symmetrical and, specifi-
cally, that Meyerson never accepted Metzger as an equal. Metzger often visited Meyerson
at his home, and occasionally he paid her visits as well—a fact that explains why there
21 Metzger to Sarton, 20 June 1922, in Metzger, “Lettres,” p. 250.
22 Metzger to Sarton, 22 Apr. 1926, in Metzger, “Lettres,” pp. 254–255.
23 Christopher Charle, “Le beau marriage d’E´ mile Durkheim,” Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales,
1984, 55:45–49.
24 Metzger to Sarton, 22 Apr. 1926, in Metzger, “Lettres,” pp. 254–255.
25 Chimisso, “He´le`ne Metzger” (cit. n. 2), p. 231.
CRISTINA CHIMISSO AND GAD FREUDENTHAL 487
are only about twenty-five documents, usually postcards sent when Metzger was away
from Paris on vacation or attending a meeting. In his messages Meyerson sometimes asks
for—and gets—bibliographical references.26 In a letter dated 25 October 1924 Metzger
writes: “I am at your disposal to work for you to the extent of my abilities. I feel well now
and capable of efforts.” But the work in question was anything but a collaboration. In a
postcard dated 22 April 1925 Metzger writes: “Unless you tell me otherwise, I will come
to prepare the catalogue of your library on Friday 24, at about 3 [P.M.].” There were also
intellectual exchanges, with Metzger on the receiving end. On 6 March 1923, just after
the publication of Les doctrines chimiques en France, Metzger writes that she would like
to call on Meyerson and ask him for some “information or advice” to help her resolve
difficulties she had encountered in her work. Similarly, in a letter dated 16 October 1925
she says that she has been studying Boerhaave’s chemical theory and would be happy if
Meyerson could “find a moment” to discuss it with her before she writes the corresponding
chapter of her book. On another occasion—called once again to serve as Meyerson’s
mouthpiece—she reports on the reaction to his message that she read to the second Inter-
national Congress of History of Science, held in London between 30 June and 4 July
1931.27
Meyerson took Metzger’s respect as his due and granted her little acknowledgment.
There was no ambiguity as to which of them was the senior scholar: not only was Meyerson
thirty years older than Metzger, but he was more erudite. Still, what Metzger sought was
not absolute equality but, rather, some recognition of her value and, above all, of her
independence. This is precisely what Meyerson could not or did not want to offer, leaving
Metzger feeling that she was being treated as “a little girl.” Although Metzger apparently
assisted Meyerson in his work on Du cheminement de la pense´e, published in 1931, her
name does not appear in the list of acknowledgments.28 Nothing better bespeaks Meyer-
son’s attitude than his request, in 1927, that Metzger—who had already published three
books herself—prepare the index for his book, just as she had prepared the catalogue of
his library two years earlier. Meyerson wanted Metzger to be a pupil and his assistant—
and to stick to that role. She thought otherwise.
Metzger was not alone in her view that Meyerson was an exceptionally impressive,
indeed intimidating, personality. On the commemoration of the centenary of Gaston Mil-
haud’s and Meyerson’s births, the philosopher Andre´ Lalande (1867–1963), one of the
leading lights of contemporary French academic philosophy, observed that whereas Mil-
26 All the documents mentioned in this paragraph are in the collection described in note 1, above. In a postcard
dated 13 Mar. 1925 Metzger gives the bibliographical details of a book by Stahl, obviously in response to a
request from Meyerson. Similarly, in a postcard dated 2 July 1926 she supplies a couple of references to her La
gene`se de la science des cristaux and continues: “de´sirez-vous que je recherche quelque document sur ce sujet?”
27 Apparently Meyerson’s health did not allow him to travel. (Indeed, concern about Meyerson’s health is
recurrent throughout Metzger’s messages to him.) Metzger writes from London (1 July 1931): “Your message,
which I read in front of 300 or 400 persons, was applauded and it made a welcome contrast with the Bolsheviks’
discourse on capitalist science and on economic history.” At this memorable congress, the sudden appearance
of a Soviet delegation, including Nicolai Bukharin, N. I. Vavilov, Boris Hessen, and E. Colman, left a lasting
impression. The “Bolshevik”—Marxist—contributions were gathered and published in an influential volume
under the title Science at the Cross Roads (London: Kniga, 1931; rpt., London: Cass, 1971). Meyerson’s address
read by Metzger was published in Archeion, 1932, 14:106.
28 The list of acknowledgments mentions Koyre´, Lalande, Le´vy-Bruhl, Lichtenstein, Metz, I. Meyerson, Parodi,
Roustan, de Broglie, Einstein, Langevin, and Meyerson’s two secretaries, Marguerite Alexandre and Suzanne
Babled. Note that Koyre´ was still a junior scholar at this stage (the first part of his E´ tudes galile´ennes, the first
of his history of science writings, would be published in 1936; the full work, dedicated to the memory of
Meyerson, appeared in 1939).
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haud was remarkable for his finesse, Meyerson stood out for the “strength” and “robust-
ness” of his writing, his conversation, and even his physical appearance (Lalande likened
him to a “bearded Jupiter”). More outspoken than Lalande, who addressed an official
ceremony in honor of Meyerson, was Moritz Schlick (1882–1936), in a private letter
written on 21 July 1929 to the philosopher of science Herbert Feigl: “In Paris I visited old
Meyerson. He is immensely self-conceited [kolossal eingebildet]; unfortunately Einstein
has confirmed him therein, by mentioning him favorably on different occasions. Still, this
is an interesting and independent mind, immensely knowledgeable.”29
In the letter published here, written in May 1933, Metzger tells Meyerson what has been
on her mind for some ten years. The two must have had an altercation not long before,
because she begins the second sentence “If you still harbor some friendship for me.”
Indeed, what follows allows us to gather that Metzger had opened her heart to Meyerson
about what she considered her “weaknesses and certain failings and fatigues, and con-
cerning [her] defective education,” and that Meyerson in response had said things that
appeared to Metzger as a demand for her “to go back to school, to learn anew what [she]
was not allowed to be taught in [her] childhood.” The circumstances behind the letter are
poignant: the seventy-four-year-old man had just undergone what Metzger knew to have
been a “a painful and disagreeable surgery”; indeed, he was to die about half a year later,
on 2 December 1933. Perhaps it was Meyerson’s weakened physical condition that at long
last gave Metzger the courage to speak up; she may also have sensed that she had best
seize the occasion, before it was too late. In any event, it is the directness and forcefulness
of her statement of independence, the outspoken and uncompromising insistence that she
be allowed to pursue her own course as she sees fit, that make this letter an exceptional
document. Metzger emphatically asks—nay, demands—Meyerson’s adherence to her con-
viction that “Heaven has bestowed upon each of us” intelligence and will and that “in the
Republic of the minds, we are all equal.” The letter is thus published here because of its
value as a human document, an early expression of women’s ongoing struggle for equality
of rights and of consideration.
Meyerson apparently never responded, for on 18 September 1933 Metzger took
the opportunity offered by the Jewish New Year to write from Strasbourg: “On the occa-
sion of the New Year, I send you my best wishes for a prompt and rapid recovery. If you
have not forgotten me completely, accept my respectful friendship [mes amitie´s respec-
tueuses].”30 The tone is grave: never before had Metzger used the very formal term “re-
spectful” in her correspondence with Meyerson; the word “friendship,” rarely used in
combination with “respectful,” is deliberately deployed to recall to mind the old warm
feelings.31 Metzger clearly understood that the earlier letter had completely undone her
29 Andre´ Lalande, “Lettre” [Se´ance du 26 novembre 1960: “Comme´moration du centenaire de la naissance de
deux E´ piste´mologues franc¸ais: E´ mile Meyerson et Gaston Milhaud”], Bull. Soc. Franc¸. Phil., 1961, pp. 53–54,
on p. 54; and Morris Schlick to Herbert Feigl, 21 July 1929, in Wiener Kreis Stichting, Moritz Schlick Nachlass,
Amsterdam, Inv.-Nr. 94, p. 9. The latter is published with the kind permission of the Wiener Kreis Stichting and
of the Philosophisches Archiv of the University of Konstanz. We are grateful to Michael Heidelberger of the
University of Tu¨bingen for calling our attention to the phrase describing Meyerson and for supplying us with a
copy of the letter.
30 Postcard dated 18 Sept. 1933: “ . . . je vous envoie a` l’occasion de la nouvelle anne´e mes meilleurs voeux
de gue´rison prompte et rapide. Si vous ne m’avez pas tout a` fait oublie´e, agre´ez mes amitie´s respectueuses.”
Only once before had Metzger sent Meyerson wishes on the occasion of the Jewish New Year: in a postcard
dated 6 Sept. 1926 she wrote, “Mes meilleurs voeux pour 5687.” The Jewish element is almost entirely absent
from Metzger’s letters to Meyerson. Except for these two New Year wishes, there is only one card (undated,
postmarked Oct. 1932), written to Meyerson from Germany by Metzger’s friend Bertha Bessmertny, to which
Metzger added three words in Yiddish (in Latin script): “Meseltov. Gut Jontef.”
31 More often than not, Metzger concludes her messages with the informal, friendly “meilleur(s) souvenir(s).”
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former relationship with Meyerson and that nothing else had grown up in its place. For
this, indeed, Metzger’s revolt came too late.
The epilogue came a few months later, after Meyerson’s death. In a short review of his
Re´el et de´terminisme dans la physique quantique, a small volume apparently written at
the request of Louis de Broglie, Metzger apologized for not discussing the book’s theses.
She explained that her grief—presumably intensified by guilt feelings—was too great for
her to do so, and instead she preferred “to talk about that which unites us, rather than that
which divides us.”32 She could neither feign support for Meyerson’s conception of the
mind nor criticize him openly. Their conflict was to remain unresolved.
* * *
He´le`ne Metzger’s letter to E´ mile Meyerson is handwritten on four pages, the first of which
carries the letterhead Club de la FONDATION UNIVERSITAIRE.33 It is published here
unaltered, with only a couple of slips of the pen silently corrected. Metzger’s characteristic
punctuation is upheld (with only some commas added) and carried over to the English
translation that follows. Note that Metzger frequently uses suspension periods, which thus
do not here indicate any deletions.
HE´ LE` NE METZGER TO E´ MILE MEYERSON: THE FRENCH ORIGINAL
Bruxelles, le 6 mai 1933
11, Rue d’Egmont
Cher Monsieur,
J’ai appris par mon oncle que vous aviez duˆ subir une ope´ration douloureuse et pe´nible; je
pense bien a` vous, j’espe`re que vous irez mieux. . . . S’il vous reste encore un peu d’amitie´
pour moi, faites-moi signe et j’irai vous distraire en reprenant nos vieilles et anime´es conver-
sations philosophiques.
En ce qui me concerne, j’ai eu occasion hier soir au cours d’une confe´rence que je ne vous
demande pas d’approuver entie`rement, de vous rendre un hommage public et de dire a` quel
point j’admirais votre œuvre. Et non seulement votre œuvre; vous meˆme qui avez su avec une
te´nacite´ inlassable re´soudre le proble`me qui a e´te´ toute votre vie l’objet de votre me´dita-
tion . . . . . .
Bien que vous ayez eu, je ne sais quelle de´ception sur moi, j’espe`re que vous serez sensible
a` ce te´moignage d’absolue since´rite´, d’affection profonde, de de´vouement et de respect.
Mais, je vous en prie, n’essayez pas de me modifier, de me changer, de me former, de me
[p. 2] de´former ou dans un sens purement scolaire d’eˆtre mon “maıˆtre”. j’ai toujours conside´re´
comme un ennemi “en puissance” tout individu (parent, professeur, me´decin etc.) qui posse`de
une parcelle d’autorite´ et qui veut se servir de son prestige pour m’imposer ses ide´es ou sa
manie`re de voir. . . . je suis de´mocrate ne´e, et en ce qui concerne l’usage de l’intelligence et
de la volonte´ que le Ciel a de´parties a` chacun de nous, je voudrais que nous ne soyons res-
ponsable que de nos fautes, non de celles que les autres nous imposent; que de nos erreurs,
aussi; si je me trompe montrez-le moi, mais ne vous servez pas de votre supe´riorite´, du fait que
vous eˆtes un grand philosophe, comme argument. . . . Dans la Re´publique des esprits nous
sommes tous e´gaux et vous devez de´montrer que vous avez la raison pour vous, non l’imposer
par la force ou l’intimidation.
La seule vue d’une belle œuvre excite mon e´mulation non un besoin de soumission envers
elle ou son auteur. Quand je vous lis, je ne me sens pas modeste ou petite fille en pre´sence de
32 He´le`ne Metzger, rev. of E´ mile Meyerson, Re´el et de´terminisme dans la physique quantique (Paris: Hermann,
1933), Archeion, 1933, 15:483–484.
33 Followed by two printed lines:
Te´le´phones club 11.97.89; secre´tariat: 12.24.22
Che`ques postaux: N 1039.46
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votre grandeur; j’ai envie de plus et de mieux travailler. Comme de Corre`ge ou [p. 3] Montes-
quieu j’ai envie de m’e´crier “Et moi aussi je suis peintre”.
Ne me prenez plus pour une enfant, une e´tudiante, mais pour une femme d’aˆge muˆr qui a
beaucoup souffert par des deuils e´pouvantables et une maladie fort grave. A` certains e´gards
vous me trouveriez vieillie avant l’aˆge . . . mais au fait j’ai 43 ans; je pourrais eˆtre grand-me`re
comme quelques-unes de mes amies. C’est un fait que je ne suis pas une jeune femme; c’est
un fait aussi que je souffre de crises cardiaques, et que par un exce`s de sensibilite´ que je
reconnais exage´re´e mais qui re´sulte de ma tachycardie que l’e´motion aggrave, apre`s avoir
entendu certaines choses, je suis malade pendant toute une journe´e et je ne puis travailler. . . .
Vous savez que toute ma vie, toute la joie et tout l’effort de ma vie est me´ditation philoso-
phique; il est abusif de me demander sans motif valable de me remettre a` l’e´cole, de re´apprendre
ce qu’on m’a refuse´ de m’enseigner e´tant enfant . . . du moins, je veux eˆtre le seul juge de
l’effort a` fournir dont je n’ai a` rendre compte a` personne et mener a` bien suivant mes propres
directions l’œuvre que je veux accomplir et que j’ai commence´e. Les confidences que je vous
ai faites sur mes insuffisances, sur certaines de´faillances et fatigues, sur mon e´ducation de´-
fectueuse prouvent mon amitie´ pour vous, ma confiance aussi.—Ne vous en servez jamais pour
m’e´craser ou me diminuer . . . je ne dois au public que mon œuvre; la pre´paration de cette
œuvre ne regarde que moi.
Et maintenant, je trouve en relisant ma lettre que je ne vous ai pas te´moigne´ assez toute mon
admiration qui a d’autant plus de valeur qu’elle ne provient d’aucune subordination ou esclavage
ou soumission envers plus grand que moi! Je vous laisse; je rentrerai a` Paris mardi et espe`re
que vous irez mieux et pourrez reprendre votre labeur.
He´le`ne Metzger
HE´ LE` NE METZGER TO E´ MILE MEYERSON: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Brussels, 6 May, 1933
11, Rue d’Egmont
Dear Sir,
I have learnt from my uncle34 that you had to undergo a painful and disagreeable surgery; I
am thinking of you, and I hope you will be better. . . . If you still harbor some friendship for
me, please drop me a line and I will come to distract you by resuming our old lively philo-
sophical discussions.
For my part, yesterday evening I had the occasion, in the course of a talk of which I do not
ask you to approve entirely, to pay you a public tribute and to say to what extent I admire your
work. And not your work alone; you yourself as well, who knew with unflagging tenacity to
resolve the problem that throughout your life has been the subject of your reflection . . . . . .
Although you have experienced I know not what disappointment with respect to me, I hope
you will be sensitive to this expression of absolute sincerity, of deep affection, of devotion, and
of respect.
But, I pray you, do not try to modify me, change me, educate me, deform me, or, in a purely
school-like manner, be my “schoolmaster.” I have always considered as a “potential” enemy
whatever individual (a parent, a teacher, a physician, etc.) who is invested with a little bit of
authority and who wants to use his35 prestige in order to impose upon me his ideas or way of
seeing things . . . I am an inborn democrat, and with respect to the use of the intelligence and
the will which Heaven has bestowed upon each of us, I wish that we36 be responsible for our
own faults only, not for those that others impose upon us; and also for our errors alone; if I
err—show it to me, but do not use your superiority, the fact that you are a great philosopher,
34 Lucien Le´vy-Bruhl (1857–1939).
35 The French does not distinguish between “his” and “her.” To write “his or her” would have been anachro-
nistic; and Metzger clearly had men in mind.
36 Perhaps the correct translation is “I,” with the rest of the sentence in the first person singular as well. Metzger
wrote “responsable” in the singular and may have intended the “pluriel de modestie,” often used in French
academic writing.
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as an argument . . . In the Republic of the minds, we are all equal and you must prove that
reason is on your side, not impose it by force or by intimidation.
The view of a brilliant work suffices to arouse my emulation, [it does] not [arouse] a need
to submit to it or to its author. When I read you, I do not feel humble, or like a little girl in the
presence of your greatness; [rather] I desire to work more and better. Like Correggio or Mon-
tesquieu, I want to cry out: “I, too, am a painter.”37
Do not anymore take me for a child, for a student, but for a woman of a mature age, who
has very much suffered by repeated awful mourning and by a very serious illness. From certain
aspects, you could find that I have grown old too quickly . . . but in fact I am 43 years old; I
could be a grandmother, like some of my friends. It is a fact that I am not a young woman; it
is also a fact that I suffer from heart attacks and from hypersensitivity, which I know is exag-
gerated, but which is a result of my tachycardia which any emotion aggravates; after hearing
certain things I am ill for a whole day and cannot work. . . .
You know that throughout my entire life, the entire joy and the entire endeavor of my life
have been philosophical reflection; it is abusive to ask of me, without a valid reason, to go back
to school, to learn anew what I was not allowed to be taught in my childhood . . . or at least,
I want to be the only one to judge the effort I have to make and for which I am not accountable
to anyone and [I want] to carry to its end, following my own directions, the work that I wish
to accomplish and which I have begun. What I confided to you concerning my deficiencies and
certain failings and fatigues, and concerning my defective education, provide the proof of my
friendship for you, and of my confidence too. —Do not ever use these in order to crush me or
diminish me . . . I owe to the public nothing except my work; the preparation of that work
concerns me alone.
Now, rereading my letter, I find that I have not enough displayed all the admiration I have
for you and which is all the more valuable as it does not come from any subordination or
enslavement, or submission to someone who is greater than I am! I must take leave; I will come
back to Paris on Tuesday and hope you will feel better and will be able to resume your labor.
He´le`ne Metzger
37 The sentence alludes to the Italian painter Antonio Allegri, known as “Il Correggio” (1489–1534), who,
after receiving a painting by Raphael, said “Anch’io son pittore!” (“I, too, am a painter”). This is the last sentence
in the preface of Montesquieu’s L’esprit des lois (1748): “If this work meets with success, I shall owe it chiefly
to the grandeur and majesty of the subject. However, I do not think that I have been totally deficient in point of
genius. When I have seen what so many great men both in France, England, and Germany have said before me,
I have been lost in admiration; but I have not lost my courage: I have said with Correggio, ‘And I also am a
painter.’ ” Quoted from Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent,
rev. by J. V. Prichard (London: Bell, 1914).
